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ABSTRACT
The objective of this review is to describe the
implementation of human factors principles for the
design of alerts in clinical information systems. First, we
conduct a review of alarm systems to identify human
factors principles that are employed in the design and
implementation of alerts. Second, we review the medical
informatics literature to provide examples of the
implementation of human factors principles in current
clinical information systems using alerts to provide
medication decision support. Last, we suggest
actionable recommendations for delivering effective
clinical decision support using alerts. A review of studies
from the medical informatics literature suggests that
many basic human factors principles are not followed,
possibly contributing to the lack of acceptance of alerts
in clinical information systems. We evaluate the
limitations of current alerting philosophies and provide
recommendations for improving acceptance of alerts by
incorporating human factors principles in their design.
Computerized clinical decision support (CDS)
systems have been deﬁned as ‘computer programs
that provide expert support for health professionals
making clinical decisions’.1 One type of CDS is the
generation of alerts that warn healthcare staff
about potential errors, enabling them to make
better therapeutic decisions. Many types of clinical
alerts are currently incorporated as part of complex
CDS systems. Medication-related alerting forms
a large part of the CDS in most clinical information
systems. Examples of medication alerts in clinical
information systems include an alert generated
when two interacting drugs are prescribed together
or a warning when the maximum dose for a drug
is exceeded. Several mechanisms of providing
medication-related decision support are available in
a care provider order entry (CPOE) system but the
speciﬁc types of alerts discussed here are visual
alerts that may or may not be interactive in nature.
Medication-related alerting used in conjunction
with a CPOE system has the ability to prevent
dangerous adverse events and serves as an impor-
tant decision support aid.2e5 However, clinicians
often override the recommendations provided in
alerts, even clinically signiﬁcant ones.6e10 In
particular, generation of an excessive number of
alerts results in ‘alert fatigue’ and highlights the
importance of reducing the utilization of this
mechanism for providing CDS.7 11 The goal should
be to reduce the number of alerts that are not useful
to the clinician. A clinician may choose to override
an alert because the data used to drive the alert may
be incorrect or not current. However, it is also
possible that a clinician might override a poten-
tially useful alert due to alert fatigue. Our goal in
this study is to discuss how the latter can be
minimized by designing alerts that incorporate
important human factors principles into alert
design.
In a previous review, Kuperman et al12 described
the state of the art in medication-related decision
support and also outlined recommendations for
optimizing the effectiveness of medication-related
alerting. Recommendations focused on: (1) bridging
our gaps in understanding the impact of such
alerting on clinician behavior; (2) optimizing alert
presentation; and (3) considering the underlying
reasons for alert fatigue.12 An understanding of
how to successfully prompt clinicians at the point
of care is a complex problem, one that requires
consideration of a combination of issues: techno-
logical, clinical, and sociotechnical. The technolog-
ical and clinical aspects have received the most
attention, while the sociotechnical aspect of
alerting, which is related to the human aspect of
the interaction between users and technology, has
been relatively neglected.
Medical informatics is a multidisciplinary ﬁeld
that has, in the past, drawn from evidence in other
domains.13e18 In this paper, we begin by summa-
rizing a wealth of research from the human factors
literature focusing on computer-based alerting
systems from a range of industry contexts. Our aim
is primarily to delineate the effects of alert design
and implementation parameters on task perfor-
mance and alert acceptability. We then review the
literature on computer-based alerting systems in
health care, focusing on medication-related alerting.
We conclude by providing actionable recommen-
dations that need further consideration for the
successful development and deployment of medi-
cation-related alerting in clinical information
systems.
METHODS
Literature review
We conducted a literature review to identify human
factors principles that have been used in alerting
systems. In this review, we also identiﬁed studies
that described how these principles have been
employed in the realm of clinical information
systems. Two researchers (EH, JE) evaluated the
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literature from the last 20 years (January 1987 to December
2007) in the following databases: Web of Knowledge, PsychLit,
Medline, PsychINFO and Google Scholar. The search terms used
were selected to identify, ﬁrst, all articles related to the design
and implementation of alerts, and second, for computerized
systems in health care. Search terms included: alarm, warning,
alert design, handling, learning, compliance, use and medication-
related alerting. These words were then combined with
keywords used to describe computerized decision support
systems such as electronic prescribing, e-prescribing, reminder
systems, decision support systems, and drug alerts and prompts.
Studies that appeared relevant were reviewed by two researchers
(JE and EH). Furthermore, the bibliographies of extracted articles
were reviewed to identify any relevant studies that were not
identiﬁed through this search strategy. Reviewers examined
studies to extract information regarding the design and imple-
mentation of the alerting system. In particular, in deﬁning the
underlying inclusion criteria for our review, we wanted to
extract information surrounding the consideration of human
factors principles in the design of the alerts themselves and on
the way these alerts were implemented.
Our intent was not to conduct an exhaustive systematic
review but instead to provide a literature-based discussion of
how human factors principles have been implemented in clinical
information systems, especially those related to medication
ordering. We selected papers that reﬂected exemplary current
implementations of medication-related alerting and used these
to identify the shortcomings of current implementations and
suggest actionable recommendations for future alert design and
implementations.
RESULTS
Review of human factors principles used in alert design
Alerting systems are implemented as safety mechanisms in
a wide variety of industries.19e24 The basic principles guiding the
successful use of alerting systems are consistent across domains.
These principles emerge from the discipline of human factors
engineering, which applies knowledge about human capabilities
and limitations to the design of products, processes, systems,
and work environments. The application of these principles
across domains improves ease of use and user satisfaction, while
reducing potential errors and user fatigue.
An alerting system should be used when it is beneﬁcial to
indicate to a user that a particular action exceeds task safety
thresholds and may undermine task accuracy, completion or
safety. Alerting systems are implemented with the aim of
improving task performance, for which careful consideration
must be given to the design and implementation of the alerting
system itself. While a well-designed alerting system will act as
a decision aid and improve task performance, a poorly designed
one may become an irritation or distraction to the user and can
impede performance. Therefore, successful adoption requires
careful consideration of not only the knowledge driving the
alerting system but also the human factors principles in alert
implementation.
We describe general guidance based on human factors principles
that can be employed in the design and implementation of
alerting systems. A majority of the alerts related to medi-
cationedecision support focus on safety, for example, drugedrug
interaction alerts, therapeutic duplication alerts, etc. The guide-
lines discussed below are also applicable to other types of alerts
available in clinical information systems, such as, blood product
alerts or alerts related to the absence of allergy information, etc.
Alerts in clinical information systems are largely visually
displayed, hence the focus of this review is on the design and
implementation of visually displayed computerized alerts in
clinical information systems. While auditory alerts have been
implemented in some clinical information systems, they are not
discussed in this review.
Alarm philosophy
The logic that underpins the determination of an event as unsafe
is termed ‘alarm philosophy ’. A well-documented alarm philos-
ophy is necessary to guide decision-making and ensure consis-
tency in alerting. Documentation of alarm philosophy should
include a catalog of unsafe events, an indication of the level of
priority (based on the severity of the consequences) of an alert,
a description of the logic underpinning the classiﬁcation of an
event as unsafe, and a description of the speciﬁc alerts indicating
each unsafe event.
We discuss below important considerations that should be
kept in mind when developing the alarm philosophy of an
alerting system. First, the underlying philosophy should seek to
minimize the overall number of alerts in the system and the
frequency with which they activate. This can be achieved by
ensuring that only safety-critical events are classiﬁed as unsafe
and requiring an alert. This, in turn, would require an explicit
deﬁnition of what is meant by a safety-critical event since this
can vary based on the judgment of the user. Another important
consideration is to assess what corrective actions are going to be
required by an alert and how the alert is acknowledged and
canceled. It is desirable that the users’ response to an alert is the
appropriate corrective action rather than an acknowledgment,
that is alerts should cancel and reset in response to the appro-
priate corrective action rather than requiring an acknowledg-
ment from the operator followed by the corrective action.
Furthermore, the corrective actions should be easy to perform,
facilitating the user ’s compliance with the alert.
False alarms
Consideration of false alarms is equally as important as the
proper ergonomic design of alerts. A false alarm occurs when an
alert activates but there is no need for the user to be aware of the
event being signaled or to take corrective action. False alarms
may be present either because the alerts in a system are too
sensitively calibrated, that is they activate before a meaningful
safety threshold is exceeded, or because alerts have been
matched to events that are basically safe rather than unsafe.
Another reason false alarms exist is because the data driving the
alert may be incorrect or out of date.
False alarms increase workload and may even cause distraction
and lower performance. There is evidence suggesting that people
will decrease their response as the false alarm rate increases,25 26
and these might not necessarily be the most clinically signiﬁcant
alerts. Recommendations to curb false alarm rates include
moving from ‘boundary based’ alarm strategies (whereby an
alarm sounds when a given parameter exceeds pre-set limits) to
intelligent alarm monitoring systems that monitor several
parameters simultaneously and use fuzzy logic-based algorithms
to initiate an alert.
Placement
The most important consideration with regard to the imple-
mentation of a visual alert is the likelihood that it will be seen by
the user. In order to be reliably detected, visual alerts must be
placed within an operator ’s visual ﬁeld. The normal viewing
angle is 15 degrees below the horizontal line of sight. However,
this may be unnecessarily restrictive and the viewing angle can
494 J Am Med Inform Assoc 2010;17:493e501. doi:10.1136/jamia.2010.005264
Review paper
be anywhere from 0 to 50 degrees below the horizontal line of
sight.27 Once the viewing angle is established, the visual ﬁeld
can be deﬁned. The visual ﬁeld is usually deﬁned vertically as
25% above and 30% below the normal viewing angle. Sanders28
deﬁned three areas in the visual ﬁeld. In the stationary ﬁeld (30
degrees horizontal from the normal viewing angle), targets can
be detected without movement; in the eye ﬁeld (30e80 degrees
horizontal from the viewing angle), targets can be detected with
eye movements; and in the head ﬁeld (80e180 degrees hori-
zontal from the normal viewing angle), targets can be detected
with head movements. Variability in screen design, dimensions
and the frequent use of additional monitors make it difﬁcult to
generalize the exact visual ﬁeld of the user. However, these
general guidelines may be useful in assessing what portions of
the screen the user is most likely to focus on.
Visual alerts should be located in the visual ﬁeld in order of
importance, so that the highest priority alerts are located in the
stationary ﬁeld, with lower priority alerts in the eye ﬁeld and
head ﬁeld. Besides being detected, it must also be clear what
situation a visual alert is indicating. The proximity compati-
bility principle of Wickens and Carswell29 suggests that in order
to make clear what situation is being indicated by a visual alert,
alerts should be grouped meaningfully and should be located in
close proximity to the controls and displays relevant to the
situation being indicated.
Visibility
Besides being detected, a visual alert must also be legible and
visible, ie, bright enough for the user to perceive when it is
presented on the screen. There are various factors that need to be
considered to improve legibility and visibility. Target size,
luminance, background contrast, and lettering characteristics are
important considerations, but are context speciﬁc and relative to
the expected viewing distance and potential exposure time. As
a generalization, the size of the target should be increased as
viewing distance increases or contrast decreases. Heglin30 reports
that a visual target should be twice as bright as the background
against which it must be detected. Practical consideration must
also be given to position alerts in order to avoid glare and
reﬂection, as both will also reduce visibility.
For text, the same factors determine visibility, but here the
size of the letters and the ratios between letter height and width
and the stroke width also determine legibility. Letter heights
should normally be larger when reading from a visual display
unit. A mixture of upper and lower case lettering is easier to read
than upper case only31; and dark text on a light background is
easier to read than light text on a dark background.32
Prioritization
Visual alerts should be prioritized, and prioritization goes hand
in hand with hazard matching as a warning implementation
strategy. In visual warning research, ‘hazard matching’ is used to
describe the process of matching the appearance of the warning
to the level of hazard implied by the situation that it indicates.33
For visual warnings, priority is normally indicated by color.
Colors such as red and orange increase the hazard, as well as the
priority, associated with a visual alert when compared with
colors such as green, blue and white.34 Colorblind users must be
considered when utilizing color to indicate the priority level of
an alert.
In addition to color the use of a signal word is particularly
relevant to text-based alerts. Providing additional information,
signal words can enhance the user ’s ability to distinguish
between alerts. Signal words are the header terms often found at
the top of warning labels, terms such as ‘danger ’, ‘warning’, and
‘caution’. A wealth of research has indicated that these signal
words exist on a continuum of perceived hazard, with ‘deadly’,
‘danger ’, and ‘lethal’ rated as implying more hazard than words
such as ‘warning’ and ‘caution’, that in turn imply more hazard
than words such as ‘note’ and ‘attention’.34e39 It should be
noted that although many standardization bodies recommend
the use of the terms ‘danger ’, followed by ‘warning’ and then
‘caution’ to denote decreasing levels of hazard, in fact most
research suggests that the terms ‘warning’ and ‘caution’ are
synonymous in terms of the level of hazard they imply. Riley
et al40 have indicated that it may be possible to prioritize visual
alerts by shape, with angular and unstable shapes (ie, an
inverted triangle) indicating higher levels of priority than regular
shapes (ie, a circle). In this text, the use of the terms ‘low
priority ’ and ‘high priority’ alerts refers to how the principle of
prioritization was adopted for a speciﬁc alert.
Color
Besides indicating priority level, color can be used in other ways
to code visual alerts and make them less confusable. For
example, visual alerts can also be color-coded by the type of
unsafe event or category of risk, by response required, or by their
function. The number of colors used to code in an environment
should be kept to a minimum (fewer than 10) as incorrect color
identiﬁcations increase with the absolute number of colors
used.41 Furthermore, color affects the legibility of text-based
alerts, with blue and green resulting in the poorest performance
and red and yellow resulting in the best.42 This is important
when considering general screen context, where a low contrast
between the target and background screen may result in
a textual alert not being easily detected.
Learnability and confusability
Color-coding is one means of making visual alerts more distinct
from one another. Another means of reducing potential
confusability between visual alerts is to minimize the number of
visual features that they share with each other. The fewer
features that alerts share, the more distinctive they appear.
Sanders and McCormick43 have shown that as the ratio of the
number of shared features between alerts increases, so does the
potential confusion. Color, shape, and size are the variables
commonly manipulated to make visual alerts distinct from one
another, although these manipulations must take into account
any coding for prioritization.
Textual information
Visual alerts can contain textual information with speciﬁc
details about the unsafe event. When text is being used in visual
alerts, the ﬁrst issue to resolve is what information should be
provided by the text. Research on the information components
of textual visual alerts has mainly focused on the context of
warning labels.44 Recommendations have been made that
a warning label should, if possible, have four information
components: a signal word to indicate the priority of the alerts
(ie, ‘note’, ‘warning’, or ‘danger ’), a statement of the nature of
the hazard, an instruction statement (telling the user how to
avoid the danger), and a consequence statement (telling the user
what might happen if the instruction information is ignored).
Research in this area has also suggested that when space
considerations make it impossible to include all four information
components, instruction and hazard statements are the most
important to include.
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Several other features of wording have been shown to inﬂuence
the effectiveness or perceived effectiveness of visual alerts. While
much of this research has been conducted in the context of
warning labels, some general principles might be important in the
context of general alert design. Features that increase the
effectiveness of visual alerts include using explicit rather than non-
explicit terms (eg, smoking causes lung cancer vs smoking is
damaging to health) leads to higher ratings of risk seriousness.45 46
In addition, it has been shown that the effectiveness of labels
can be increased by the use of deﬁnitive rather than probabi-
listic statements,46 47 and by including personal pronouns, ie,
‘You must (.)’, in the wording.47 Previous research indicates
that, for clarity, the order of words should reﬂect the order of
required actions (ie, ‘turn off engine before opening emergency
exit’ rather than ‘to open emergency exit ﬁrst turn off engine’),
that afﬁrmative and active sentences are used, and that
instructions are standardized and validated for clarity and
understandability with the intended user population.43 While
these ﬁndings may not be completely generalizable to alerting
in dynamic computer screens, some of the basic principles are
useful in the determination of the text accompanying
computerized visual alerts.
Habituation
Habituation refers to a reduction in the behavioral or physio-
logical response to a stimulus that occurs with repeated expo-
sure to that stimulus, if the stimulus does not have
consequences for the recipient. If we think of an alert as
a stimulus, then it is apparent that habituation has important
implications for the design and implementation of alerts.
Habituation predicts that repeated exposure to an alert that
does not require a meaningful response will result in a decrease,
and eventual elimination of, responding to the alert. The
phenomenon of habituation highlights the necessity to reduce
false alarm rates in alerting systems. For example, when an alert
activates erroneously and then requires no response, the likeli-
hood of a future response to it will be reduced. Indeed, habitu-
ation probably explains the reduction in responses to alerts with
a high false alarm rate that have been observed.26 The existence
of habituation also underscores the importance of an alarm
philosophy that does not over-warn. Habituation may also
imply that if the alerts that a user is exposed to all look or sound
the same, then they will be perceived as the being the same
stimulus and that habituation to them is more likely. Current
research is limited in its understanding of how varying the
appearance or sound of alerts, by priority or risk category, will
likely help them to be perceived as different stimuli, reducing the
likelihood of habituation.
Mental models
The belief and understanding that individuals have about
a particular topic is called their ‘mental model’.48 When people
interact with technology, they form mental models of the
objects with which they interact. Users’ mental models of the
task are likely to be derived from a variety of sources and contain
inaccuracies or missing information. Given that mental models
will be part of what drives subsequent behavior, it is essential
that alerting systems adequately support users’ mental models
and correct them as appropriate. In order to achieve this,
systems designers must elucidate the mental models that users
already have of a given task.49e52 This will allow systems to
support users’ assessment of the risks and processes associated
with performing the tasks. Systems can be designed to reﬂect
users’ mental models by allowing users to express how they
conceptualize a system to work.
Proximity of task components being displayed
Research into the design of visual displays distinguishes between
different types of tasks being performed by the operator and the
different displays that should be designed to support those tasks.
Carswell et al53 describe the ‘proximity compatibility principle’,
whereby tasks can be conceptualized as being either high or low
in proximity. A high proximity task requires the integration of
information from different sources, dimensions, or categories for
successful task completion, whereas a low proximity task
requires information from different sources, dimensions or
categories to be judged independently from each other.
The proximity compatibility principle suggests that high
proximity tasks should be supported by high proximity displays
and that low proximity tasks should be supported by low
proximity displays. A high proximity display is achieved by
ensuring that the components that are important for task
decision-making are represented in the display in a perceptually
similar manner. This can be achieved by presenting them as an
integrated object and by presenting them close together spatially
or temporally. For example, Robinson et al54 found that a rect-
angle showing one task component as length and another task
component as height was an advantageous way of displaying
multidimensional data in a simulated ﬂight task. While research
such as this supports the use of high proximity displays to
support high proximity tasks, it also makes the point that a high
proximity display may result in poorer performance if the task is
low proximity, ie, one that requires task components to be
judged independently. The application of this principle is rele-
vant in health care, where it has been shown that anesthesiol-
ogists’ cognitive demand in interacting with a cardiovascular
visualization system could be reduced by placing relevant pieces
of information close together.55
A number of relevant studies across domains have utilized
these human factors principles to be able to improve the deci-
sion-making processes of the user. Computer-based alerts, irre-
spective of the domain for which they are constructed, need to
consider the design principles discussed above. In the next
section, we describe a literature review we conducted to
understand how these principles have been employed in clinical
information systems that utilized alerts for providing medica-
tion decision support.
Use of human factors principles in medication-related alerting
Development of a sound alarm philosophy and careful consid-
eration of human factors principles form the underpinnings of
effective alarm management. Despite their signiﬁcance these
factors have received less importance in the design of alerts in
clinical information systems. We provide a literature-based
discussion of how human factors principles have been imple-
mented in clinical information systems. We have considered
these human factors principles and have the following recom-
mendations for future alert design.
Anton et al56 described a computerized prescribing system
used in the inpatient renal unit of a teaching hospital, where the
alerting messages given to the provider were based on seven
levels of urgency. An activity dimension was subsumed into the
system, whereby depending on the level of urgency, the user was
required to execute one or more different actions. Several limi-
tations, both in terms of the nature as well as the structure,
existed in the alarm philosophy. First, a single urgency metric
was calculated regardless of the type of risk. Second, the logic for
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the calculation of this metric was not always apparent to the
user. Third, the alerting system itself transgressed basic human
factors principles. For example, the system described a category
of alerts called ‘red information’. However, despite the use of the
word ‘red’, the information itself was low priority, and no action
was required. Fourth, missing data were categorized as a high
priority alert by default, even though, in practice, missing data
could be high or low priority. In addition to these limitations,
some of the inferences drawn from the study were not based on
empirical evidence. The authors inferred that providers with
more experience using this system produced fewer alerts, and
the decrease in alerts was interpreted as an improvement.
Finally, there was no indication of how the alerting system was
calibrated in terms of the relative severity of speciﬁc prescribing
decisions. If the entire system was calibrated conservatively,
then presumably acceptable but risky prescribing decisions
would decrease as the propensity of the users to generate fewer
alerts increased.
In another study, Kilbridge et al57 evaluated inpatient CPOE
systems at six medical centers in the USA. One hospital used
a CPOE system that was developed in-house, while the
remaining hospitals used commercial vendors. These systems
were designed to provide alerts for 12 categories of prescribing
errors, of which at least 50% were serious prescribing errors. The
categories used in this system were: therapeutic duplication,
single and cumulative dose events, allergies and cross allergies,
contraindicated route of administration, drugedrug and
drugefood interactions, four categories of contraindication
(patient diagnosis, age/weight, dose-related laboratory studies
and dose-related laboratory radiology studies), corollary, and cost
of care and nuisance (adverse events with low consequence)
alerts. A grading system was developed for these categories, the
details of which were not reported in the paper.
Two studies described potentially problematic categories for
which electronic prescribing systems should provide alerts. Luo58
described nine categories of events which need to be signaled.
These were medication withdrawal, missing data, drugedrug
interaction, drug interactions with medications already being
taken by the patient, rearranging of priorities by the family
practitioner because of the system itself, knowledge gaps by the
user, over-conﬁdence in the efﬁcacy of the system on the part of
the user, data overload, and problems with the system. The
study did not suggest that these situations should form part of
the alert philosophy, but simply listed these as possible sources
of problems. According to Goundry-Smith59 medication alerts
should be provided for the following categories: allergy checking;
drug interactions; duplicate therapy/drug doubling; cautions/
contraindications; dose checking; formulary/prescribing status;
and monitoring warnings.
Taylor and Tamblyn60 identiﬁed eight alert categories used by
the Medical Ofﬁce of the Twenty First Century (MOXXIeIII)
CDS system. In this intervention, CDS was provided to 30
outpatient primary care physicians through a personal digital
assistant. The alert categories identiﬁed were age-related
contraindications, allergies, adverse health contraindications,
dosing errors, therapeutic duplication, known patient intoler-
ance, medical interaction, and possible toxicity effects. All of
these eight categories were directly related to the drugs them-
selves. The study showed that different categories of alerts
were subject to higher or lower rates dismissal. Users
disregard age alerts the least, while ignoring dosing errors and
intolerance the most. Alternatively, users demonstrated greater
compliance with interaction and adverse health contraindica-
tions categories.
van Mil et al61 illustrated 10 care activity codes assigned by
community pharmacists to computer-generated alerts. These
categories were: interaction; contraindication; allergy; drug
duplication; unclear prescription; questionable strength; dosage
different from a previous prescription; drug dispensed for the
ﬁrst time; incorrect patient data; and unusual quantity. Most of
the categories corresponded to the alerts issued by the electronic
system used in outpatient pharmacies.
Alert philosophies might be based on the most common
causes of prescribing error. In a study that examined inpatient
orders, Bobb et al62 identiﬁed the most common types of errors
in prescribing: dose; frequency; nomenclature; drug allergy;
incorrect medication; omission; duplication; route; and drug
interactions. The authors also described a set of provider-related
issues which may cause error, such as lack of knowledge of the
patient, lack of speciﬁc medical knowledge, and mental slips.
This study pointed to a general quandary in alert design: how to
limit the scope of alert philosophy. For example, should the
scope be limited to the patient and his/her drugs or should the
scope be expanded to anticipate gaps in the provider ’s knowl-
edge or compensate for a system’s lack of information. Ideally,
all of these issues should be considered when the alert philos-
ophy is developed.
Nightingale et al8 described the impact on prescribing behavior
of a rule-based CPOE system implemented in an inpatient renal
unit. Although the details of the alerting system were not
described, the alerts were produced in response to a range of the
usual prescribing issues, such as drugedrug interactions, aller-
gies, etc, as well as in response to non-prescribing activities, such
as password-related alerts. The data also showed that low
priority alerts were much more prevalent than alerts for high
priority events. An example of a low priority event would be
warning a nurse when he/she attempts to prematurely admin-
ister a drug, whereas a high priority alert would ﬁre upon
ordering penicillin for a patient who has a known penicillin
allergy. When developing an alert philosophy, one must carefully
consider the threshold of the alert. Previous studies have
demonstrated that systems tend to have a low alerting
threshold, resulting in physicians receiving a large number of
clinically insigniﬁcant alerts. In studying an outpatient CPOE
system in hospital-based clinics and community-based practices,
Weingart et al10found that physicians justiﬁably overrode 91% of
allergy alerts. Similar to the study by Nightingale et al,8 Wein-
gart et al10 showed that high priority alerts were much less
prevalent than lower priority alerts; however, providers overrode
nearly 90% of high severity alerts.
In a study describing their experience with the development
of the WizOrder system, an inpatient CPOE system developed
and implemented at Vanderbilt Medical Center, Miller et al63
described their alerting philosophy with respect to the timing of
alerts. The type of alert determined the timing of its appearance
in the workﬂow during CPOE. Rather than ﬁring a drugedrug
interaction or allergy alert after a physician has completed
a medication order, an alert is ﬁred as soon as the physician ﬁrst
indicates the name of the new medication to be prescribed,
enhancing alerting efﬁciency. On the other hand, following an
order for a blood thinner such as heparin, an alert could remind
the clinician to order a partial thromboplastin time at the end of
the order entry session. Holding such an alert until order
completion facilitates a smooth workﬂow and promotes physi-
cian autonomy. Such delayed warnings or ‘exit checks’ give
clinicians the opportunity to correct errors spontaneously and
prevents overreliance on the clinical information system to make
decisions. In addition, the WizOrder system prevents excessive
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alerting by generating general non-clinical alerts (ie, alerts
advising users of new CPOE features) once and then spontane-
ously removing the user from the new users list.63 Miller et al63
also described the use of effective placement or ‘geographical
consistency ’ whereby the same types of clinical information are
displayed in the same areas of the screen in order to draw
attention to important warnings.
In general, the studies reviewed showed that there was a lack
of uniformity in the logic for generating alerts. This was
exempliﬁed by a comparison done by Fernando et al,64 who
evaluated four alerting systems and found large discrepancies in
alert ﬁring criteria. The study evaluated the safety features of
four commonly used primary care CPOE systems in the UK. The
discrepancies in alerting arose because of differences in the
underlying knowledge bases used in these CPOE systems.
The UK National Health Service Common User Interface
Project effectively outlined the general design principles for
alerting.65 The study employed alerts for six categories: drug
information; drug warning; drug critical; information; warning
conﬁrmation; and system critical. Only three of these categories
(drug information, drug warning, and drug critical) were related
to prescribingdthe other three categories of alerts were infor-
mational. Informational alerts were used to inform the user that
referral details had been sent, while warning conﬁrmation alerts
presented the user with information about his or her actions in
relation to the system. System critical alerts informed the user of
important system features. There are two issues that need
consideration in this alerting schema. First, the three system
alerts are very similar in design to drug-related alerts, potentially
resulting in confusion. Also, this schema entails presentation of
three different types of alerts (for allergy, drugedrug interac-
tions, and drug contraindications), each with three levels of
priority. This requires the alert to provide information about the
category of risk being warned about, as well as the priority of
the alert within that category. In this case, we recommend that
system warnings be easily distinguishable from drug warnings.
Horsky et al66 described a cognitive walk-though of a provider
order entry system for heparin dosing, drawing attention to
a number of deﬁcits in the timing and manner of alert presen-
tation. For example, delayed presentation of administrative
guidelines decreased their usefulness, and the graphical repre-
sentation of data was not well conceptualized. Also, a key piece
of information, such as the calculated dose for a patient, was
embedded in general text about the administration of heparin.
This study highlighted the importance of the principles of
proximity and prioritization by elucidating the effectiveness of
appropriately timing information presentation and of distin-
guishing urgent information.
A review by van der Sijs et al7 in 2006 considered a number of
papers which have looked at the efﬁcacy of alerts. In this study,
they found that physicians overrode alerts between 49% and
96% of the time, although the override rates for interactions and
contraindications were lower (35% and 43%). Low-level alerts
were overridden more often than high-level alerts. The most
signiﬁcant ﬁnding, however, was the lack of a systematic stan-
dardizing of alerts. This suggests a problem, both in terms of
alert philosophy and the design and presentation of the alerts
themselves. Van der Sijs et al7 point to a number of reasons for
a high rate of alert override, all of which are well known in the
alarms literature and have been indicated at various points in
this report. The most signiﬁcant contributor to a high override
rate was high signal-to-noise ratios, ie, presenting too many low
priority alerts. In addition, textual information lacked brevity.
Reasons for a high override rate also included the lack of
knowledge about the importance of the alert, suggesting that
alerts had not been categorized by urgency and coded by color,
size, and use of signal words. The authors describe an effective
alerting system to be one that is tailored to either or both the
user and the patient, has appropriately prioritized alerts which
are designed in a way that can be easily understood by the user.
The content of medication alerts has been well studied within
the domain of informatics. Nonetheless, very few studies have
focused their attention on how these alerts should be commu-
nicated to the end-user. Following this review, we developed
a set of actionable recommendations for future alerting systems,
summarized in box 1. In the next section, we discuss the
implementation of some recommendations and the consequent
impact on the use of these clinical systems.
DISCUSSION
The medical informatics literature suggests that while there is
general agreement about the major drug issues for which clini-
cians should be alerted, there is little agreement on how these
alerts should be generated. In addition, studies evaluating the
occurrence of alerts suggest that alerts for low severity events
are much more prevalent than those for high severity events,
Box 1 Actionable recommendations for the design and
implementation of future clinical information systems
1. Alert philosophy: This should specify (as a minimum) which
categories of problems should be included in the alerting
system, and how many priorities there should be for each
category of risk. A distinction should be made between alerts
related to medications versus those that relate to system
errors.
2. Prioritization of alerts: This should probably include three
levels: low, medium, and high and should be coded using
word, color, shape, position on screen, and other indicators
known to influence urgency.
3. Low priority alerts: These should be avoided or classified as
‘information only’ indicators. Although from a safety point of
view more alerts are seen as safer, in practice the reverse is
true.
4. Information which is linked in forming a holistic judgement
should be linked together perceptually; information which is
disparate and needs to be considered separately should be
readily differentiable.
5. Information which is contemporaneous should be presented
at the same time in the system.
6. Interfaces which are tailored to the user and/or the patient are
likely to lead to fewer perceived false alarms, and are likely to
be less irritating, and less prone to error.
7. Alerts which require acknowledgement before the user
moves on should be kept to a minimum.
8. Auditory alerts might have a very specific role in some
circumstances, for example missing patient data, and should
be considered for use in combination with visual alerts.
9. The presentation of alert information, and information more
generally, should as far as possible match the mental models
of the user.
10. The format of alerts should be chosen in order to avoid
habituation. Alerts of the same level of severity should be
perceived as equally urgent, but different from those of
a lower severity or purpose.
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and that users override the vast majority of low severity alerts.
Few studies have examined the reason for frequently overriding
low severity alerts, but it is most likely due to a conservatively
calibrated system. Overly conservative calibrations would
trigger an excessive amount of non-severe alerts that the user
might consider insigniﬁcant. Over time, these excessive and
clinically insigniﬁcant alerts could encourage users to lose faith
in the reliability of the system, increasing the frequency of non-
severe alert overrides. An alert philosophy which encourages low
priority alerts will lead to many more alerts than one that
signals for only high priority problems, since the prevalence of
the latter is usually much lower. Given that low priority alerts
are generally overridden, an important consideration is whether
or not they should be included at all, or assigned to an ‘infor-
mation only ’ category. More research is needed to determine the
effectiveness and possibility of causing harm when low priority
alerts are not generated in a clinical information system. On the
one hand, the removal of these alerts could focus the provider ’s
attention on high priority alerts, while on the other, removing
them completely may result in unintended harm in situations
where these alerts were meaningful to the provider and the
patient in context.
The design features outlined in the UK Common User Inter-
face Project provide a valuable representation of employing
human factors principles in alerting. In this project, drug alerts
were prioritized into three levels based on severity. The study
recommended the following design features: using green, yellow
and red to indicate the three levels; presenting the lowest
priority information in the periphery of the visual ﬁeld, but the
second and ﬁrst priority information in the centre of the screen
so as to be in the centre of the viewer ’s visual ﬁeld; the appro-
priate use of urgent signal words (‘information’, ‘warning’, and
‘stop’) to differentiate between levels of priority. Finally, alert
messages were designed to consist of four components: a signal
word; the hazard itself; instructions; and consequences. The
standardization of alerts along a common design framework and
the use of human factors principles allow the system to alerts
users effectively.
Alerts are meant to serve as a safety net for providers, but one
key problem with current alarm philosophies is the large
numbers of alerts, many of which disrupt workﬂow and are
ignored. Robezieks67 highlights the advantages of providing only
high priority alerts in order to minimize interruption of work-
ﬂow. That study also highlights the frustration caused by
interrupting alerts which are not relevant to the speciﬁc
prescribing. Over-alerting as well as lack of tailoring of the
system to the speciﬁc requirements of the user, or the speciﬁc
details relevant to the patient being prescribed for, will not only
frustrate the user but will lead to the impression that of the
system generates an excessive amount of false alerts, which will
in turn degrade the integrity of the system. In addition,
prescribing medications is an inherently complex task that
requires taking into account the physiological condition of the
patient along with characteristics of age, disease severity, etc, all
of which might not be accounted for in the alert logic. Future
alarm philosophies might take into consideration this
complexity by assigning a ‘risk level’ rather than a simplistic
‘true/false’ for alerting clinicians.
In general, during alert design, alarm philosophies should
consider the characteristics of speciﬁcity, information content,
sensitivity, workﬂow, and safe and efﬁcient handling. Alerts
should be of clinical signiﬁcance, denote urgency, and they
should be accurate. These recommendations closely follow
human factors principles about warning presentation. The
studies reviewed determined their alert philosophies in a wide
variety of ways. While some complied with basic design
recommendations, others were not speciﬁc in informing the
users about the underlying logic and the consequences of their
actions. Designing an alert philosophy should undertake both
tasks of outlining the nature as well as the structure of the
alerts. Focusing on only one of these characteristics can under-
mine the effectiveness of alerts.
In this review, we limited our discussion to studies that
implemented medication-related visual alerts as this is the most
common alert modality used in clinical information systems.
Several factors, beyond the human factors principles discussed
here, need consideration in alert design. The modality of the
alert, medium of presenting the alert, design of accompanying
alerts, and the setting in which the clinical information system
is implemented all play an important role and require further
examination. Future work should explore how alert modality
(visual or auditory) would impact acceptance among users
because each category has its strengths and weaknesses. While
we limited our review to medication alerting, the human factors
principles discussed here are applicable to the design of alerts for
other types of orders, such as laboratory results, radiology, etc.
Also, the design of these non-medication alerts would conse-
quently impact the design of medication alerts. Further explo-
ration is needed to understand how a medium or a combination
of mediums for presenting these alerts, ie, pagers, personal
digital assistants, phones or other mobile and stationary devices
or a combination of audio/visual modalities, may inﬂuence alert
design. Determination of the optimal modality and medium
would depend upon the speciﬁc setting in which the clinical
information system would be used. Visual alerts may be most
appropriate in a setting which is noisy or when noise is partic-
ularly undesirable. Also, user response to an alert would be
determined by whether other forms of automated decision
support are in place. Further research is needed to determine
whether speciﬁc healthcare settings are better suited to visual,
auditory or a combination of modalities, and how alert design
can be tailored to suit the needs of the environment in which the
clinical information system is implemented.
A number of studies suggest that computerized alerts and
prompts can improve prescribing and medication error rates
when carefully managed.68e70 However, these alerts are not
a panacea, and many implementations may actually be deliv-
ering little or no beneﬁt if active management is not undertaken.
This is of particular concern with alerts in CPOE systems that
employ commercial drug frameworks to generate alert logic. In
these systems users have little or no ability to manipulate alert
priorities and content.
Studies thus far have focused mainly on understanding the
override rates of alerts as a measure of the efﬁcacy of the
alert.7 10 71e73 Override rates are accessible and represent
a valuable process measure. It will be helpful to assess the
relationships between alerts and outcomes.
This review highlights how key human factors principles,
such as learnability and confusability, placement, and visibility,
etc, have not been adequately considered, implemented or
described in the design of alerts in clinical information systems.
Despite the usefulness of these human factors principles in other
domains, their utility in clinical information systems has not
been directly and comprehensively evaluated. While general
design principles may be common, their impact on the complex
domain of patient care needs further evaluation. Further research
is also needed to examine how alert design changes can help or
harm the provider ’s decision-making abilities.
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The complex nature of clinical information systems requires
careful consideration of human factors principles for future alert
design and implementation. A deeper understanding of these
design principles in the clinical context might reveal unique
characteristics of clinical information systems that cannot be
fulﬁlled by existing knowledge of these principles and might lead
to the development of new human factors principles that are
speciﬁc to the domain of medical informatics.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the wealth of literature and experience available on alert
design and implementation, we found that there were major
deﬁciencies in many clinical systems, suggesting that current
best practices are not being routinely implemented. Issues
relating to what alerts are delivered, and how they are delivered
are both extremely important. Addressing these issues requires
additional research and stronger consensus by subject matter
experts on the criteria that justify alert generation. Additional
evidence supporting the ‘how’ of delivering alerts should be
obtained to better inform design and implementation of future
clinical alerting systems. Better use of human factors principles
in the design of CDS systems demands more attention from the
medical informatics community and from health information
technology developers.
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